Just enough to freeze a thin sheet of ice in the pond. Highlight of the stay was the lovely picture that you enjoy anytime of the day:Wimpy willow tree by the pond n pavilions with the majestic Jade Dragon Snow mountain as the backdrop.
Guys driving the buggy were friendly n well-informed of the local attractions. Well, I'll love to be back there for its luxurious space, peace n scenery.
I agree Living really is a beautiful part of China and our location next to She old town is very special. Next time you visit you must go to Aisha which is only a short taxi ride from the hotel.
It is full of Nazi cultural experiences and gives a glimpse of local life. Happy you enjoyed your stay and look forward to welcoming you back.
Reviewed April 7, 2016, via mobile We previously stayed here about 5 years ago and I'm happy to say that the hotel has maintained and even improved its standards. Note that master and secondary bedrooms are both queen/king-size beds.
I think you can request the secondary bedroom also be 2x twins but will need to check with hotel. Lots of flowers blooming although we were on tail end of Laura season.
In general, it was lightly flavored to cater to those guests, however can add their lovely hot sauce to spice it up as need be. If much prefer the local restaurants such as I (one) in she and impression Aisha (although Aisha may need to order car to wait for return trip).
One new thing is that apparently if you want to cook in the kitchen, they mentioned they would provide the basic oil, salt, etc. I love the quiet location which is 10 min walk into she north gate old town, 10 min drive to Aisha old town, between Living and jade snow mountain; however, taxis are not plentiful, take about 20 min to order one from town, and also charge a bit more (between 30-50 RMB) to come out.
Be warned that usually the mountain peak is covered by afternoon with clouds. Concerning the hotel food, I am happy to report that instead of western food, we are launching a completely new concept for the all day dining restaurant next week.
We are going very local with Yunnan Cuisine, featuring favorites from the area and region. Of course, if guests still require some simple western food it will also be available.
Reviewed April 3, 2016, Service is excellent, room also great, hotel is close to old town, take 7-10 minutes, through the balcony can see the snow mountain, beautiful sightseeing! There you will find many interesting arts and crafts as well as some real “Characters” who live in the village.
Reviewed March 29, 2016, We were welcomed with delicious ginger and honey tea and were given the 5-star treatment from the beginning to the end of our stay. We loved the jacuzzi suite where we could enjoy drinking wine under the stars.
Marvel spoke excellent English and was very helpful in planning tours. Nigel the General Manager was keen to make sure all went smoothly.
We visited third week of March when the cherry blossom were out and the scenery was spectacular. The Nazi people make the trip a memorable stay with their hospitality and kind spirit.
Great to have met you and happy you enjoyed your stay. Reviewed November 6, 2016, We stayed two nights in a double room that was nice, clean and cozy.
Reviewed October 8, 2016, via mobile We spent over a week during the Chinese national holiday. The hostel was fairly busy while we stayed however there was little in the way of atmosphere and the common areas weren't often used.
There is also a yoga room on the roof of one of the buildings but when we went to check it out it seemed to be being used as a bedroom... We bypassed Jade Emu on the way to Five Elements and the common area seemed nicer/more lively so perhaps something to think about but overall Five Elements was fine. Reviewed September 16, 2016, via mobile The hostel was much too noisy at night.
Reviewed August 26, 2016, We stayed for 2 weeks and absolutely loved every day at Five Elements in Dali. It is a quiet hostel with an eclectic common area (with billiards, a bar, etc.
), a quaint garden courtyard, and an upstairs yoga room. The staff cleaned our bathroom and emptied trash every single day (which is uncommon for hostels in China) and changed our sheets every 3-4 days.
The TV has lots of free English and Chinese movies. After eating dinner and seeing a room at Jade, we were glad we chose Five Elements.
We spent our first night in a basic room next to the courtyard and found it to be quite noisy and bright in the morning. We requested to change rooms and the staff happily obliged.
Also, we found the rental bikes to be too small for us and not in good working condition. Reviewed August 10, 2016, via mobile I was visiting Dali in summer and really enjoyed my stay at the hostel.
Total casualties :15,000,000 –22,000,000 ^ From 1941 onward ^ This number does not include Japanese killed by Chinese forces in the Burma campaign and does not include Japanese killed in Manchuria. ^ Excluding more than 1 million who were disarmed following the surrender of Japan ^ Including casualties of Japanese puppet forces.
The combined toll is most likely around 3,500,000: 2.5 million Japanese, per their own records, and 1,000,000 collaborators. The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) was a military conflict that was primarily waged between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.
In China, the war is known as the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (simplified Chinese : ; traditional Chinese : ; pinyin : Zhngguó Angry Shenzhen), or as the oriental theater of the World Anti-Fascist War, the latter term originating from Mao Zedong's wartime alliance with Stalin. The beginning of the war is conventionally dated to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident 7 July 1937, when a dispute between Japanese and Chinese troops in Peking escalated into a full-scale invasion.
In 2017 the Ministry of Education in the People's Republic of China decreed that the term “eight-year war” in all textbooks should be replaced by “fourteen-year war”, with a revised starting date of 18 September 1931 provided by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. According to historian Reyna Matter, historians in China are unhappy with the blanket revision, and (despite sustained tensions) the Republic of China did not consider itself to be continuously at war with Japan over these six years.
China fought Japan with aid from the Soviet Union and the United States. After the Japanese attacks on Malaya and Pearl Harbor in 1941, the war merged with other conflicts which are generally categorized under those conflicts of World War II as a major sector known as the China Burma India Theater.
It accounted for the majority of civilian and military casualties in the Pacific War, with between 10 and 25 million Chinese civilians and over 4 million Chinese and Japanese military personnel missing or dying from war-related violence, famine, and other causes. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese imperialist policy to expand its influence politically and militarily in order to secure access to raw material reserves, food, and labor.
The period after World War I brought about increasing stress on the Japanese polity. Leftists sought universal suffrage and greater rights for workers.
Increasing textile production from Chinese mills was adversely affecting Japanese production and the Great Depression brought about a large slowdown in exports. All of this contributed to militant nationalism, culminating in the rise to power of a militarist faction.
This faction was led at its height by the Hide Tojo cabinet of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association under edict from Emperor Hirohito. In 1931, the Murder Incident helped spark the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
The Chinese were defeated and Japan created a new puppet state, Manchu ; many historians cite 1931 as the beginning of the war. From 1931 to 1937, China and Japan continued to skirmish in small, localized engagements, so-called “incidents”.
Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese scored major victories, capturing Beijing, Shanghai and the Chinese capital of Nanjing in 1937, which resulted in the Rape of Nanjing. With the strong material support through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1937, the Nationalist Army of China and the Chinese Air Force were able to continue putting up strong resistance against the Japanese offensive.
While the Japanese were also unable to defeat the Chinese communist forces in Shaanxi, who waged a campaign of sabotage and guerrilla warfare against the invaders, they ultimately succeeded in the year-long Battle of South Jiangxi to occupy Banning, which cut off the last sea access to the wartime capital of Chongqing. While Japan ruled the large cities, they lacked sufficient manpower to control China's vast countryside.
In November 1939, Chinese nationalist forces launched a large scale winter offensive, while in August 1940, Chinese communist forces launched a counteroffensive in central China. The United States supported China through a series of increasing boycotts against Japan, culminating with cutting off steel and petrol exports into Japan by June 1941.
Additionally, American mercenaries such as the Flying Tigers provided extra support to China directly. In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and declared war on the United States.
In 1945, the Chinese Expeditionary Force resumed its advance in Burma and completed the Led Road linking India to China. China regained all territories lost to Japan.
In Japan, nowadays, the name “Japan–China War” (Japanese : , Romanized : Pitch Sense) is most commonly used because of its perceived objectivity. When the invasion of China proper began in earnest in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used “The North China Incident” (Japanese: /, Romanized: Hokusai Then/Keyhole Then), and with the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai the following month, it was changed to “The China Incident” (Japanese: , Romanized: China Then).
The word “incident” (Japanese: , Romanized: then) was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal declaration of war. From the Japanese perspective, localizing these conflicts was beneficial in preventing intervention from other nations, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, which were its primary source of petroleum and steel respectively.
A formal expression of these conflicts would potentially lead to American embargo in accordance with the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. In addition, due to China's fractured political status, Japan often claimed that China was no longer a recognizable political entity on which war could be declared.
Although the Japanese government still uses the term “China Incident” in formal documents, the word China is considered derogatory by China and therefore the media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like “The Japan–China Incident” (Japanese: /, Romanized: Nikkei Aiken/Nissan Aiken), which were used by media as early as the 1930s. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility.
For example, the warlord Zhang Dublin of Manchuria from the Venetian clique openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) formed by the Km swept through southern and central China until it was checked in Shandong, where confrontations with the Japanese garrison escalated into armed conflict.
The conflicts were collectively known as the Jinan incident of 1928, during which time the Japanese military killed several Chinese officials and fired artillery shells into Jinan. Between 2,000 and 11,000 Chinese and Japanese civilians were believed to have been killed during these conflicts.
Relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and Japan severely worsened as a result of the Jinan incident. His son, Zhang Fueling, took over as the leader of the Venetian clique in Manchuria.
Later in the same year, Zhang decided to declare his allegiance to the Nationalist government in Nanjing under Chiang Kaiser, and consequently, China was nominally reunified under one government. The July–November 1929 conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railroad (CER) further increased the tensions in the Northeast that led to the Murder Incident and eventually the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The Soviet Red Army victory over Zhang Xueliang's forces not only reasserted Soviet control over the CER in Manchuria but revealed Chinese military weaknesses that Japanese Wanting Army officers were quick to note. The Soviet Red Army performance also stunned the Japanese.
Manchuria was central to Japan's East Asia policy. Both the 1921 and 1927 Imperial Eastern Region Conferences reconfirmed Japan's commitment to be the dominant power in the Northeast.
The 1929 Red Army victory shook that policy to the core and reopened the Manchurian problem. The time to act was drawing near and Japanese plans to conquer the Northeast were accelerated.
In 1930, the Central Plains War broke out across China, involving regional commanders who had fought in alliance with the Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition, and the Nanjing government under Chiang. The Communist Party of China (CPC) previously fought openly against the Nanjing government after the Shanghai massacre of 1927, and they continued to expand during this civil war.
The Kuomintang government in Nanjing decided to focus their efforts on suppressing the Chinese Communists through the Encirclement Campaigns, following the policy of “first internal pacification, then external resistance” (Chinese: ). The internecine warfare in China provided excellent opportunities for Japan, which saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for its manufactured goods (now excluded from the markets of many Western countries as a result of Depression -era tariffs), and a protective buffer state against the Soviet Union in Siberia.
Japan invaded Manchuria outright after the Murder Incident in September 1931. Japan charged that its rights in Manchuria, which had been established as a result of its victory at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, had been systematically violated and there were “more than 120 cases of infringement of rights and interests, interference with business, boycott of Japanese goods, unreasonable taxation, detention of individuals, confiscation of properties, eviction, demand for cessation of business, assault and battery, and the oppression of Korean residents”.
Militarily too weak to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation led to the publication of the Litton Report, condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations.
The Tango Truce established in its aftermath, gave Japan control of Jewel province as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. Japan aimed to create another buffer zone between Manchu and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing.
Japan increasingly exploited China's internal conflicts to reduce the strength of its fractious opponents. Even years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the Yangtze River Delta.
Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: ; pinyin: huábitèshhùa), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement.
The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chair, Sui yuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong. On the night of 7 July 1937, Chinese and Japanese troops exchanged fire in the vicinity of the Marco Polo (or Lugo) Bridge, a crucial access-route to Beijing.
What began as confused, sporadic skirmishing soon escalated into a full-scale battle in which Beijing and its port city of Tianjin fell to Japanese forces (July–August 1937). On 29 July, some 5,000 troops of the 1st and 2nd Corps of the East Hope Army mutinied, turning against the Japanese garrison.
In addition to Japanese military personnel, some 260 civilians living in Hangzhou in accordance with the Boxer Protocol of 1901, were killed in the uprising (predominantly Japanese including the police force and also some ethnic Koreans). Only around 60 Japanese civilians survived, who provided both journalists and later historians with firsthand witness accounts.
Japanese landing near Shanghai, November 1937The Imperial General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, content with the gains acquired in northern China following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, initially showed reluctance to escalate the conflict into full-scale war. The Km, however, determined that the “breaking point” of Japanese aggression had been reached.
Chiang Kaiser quickly mobilized the central government's army and air force, placed them under his direct command, and laid siege to the Japanese area of Shanghai International Settlement, where 30,000 Japanese civilians lived with 30,000 troops on 12 August 1937. An NRA soldiers' machine gun nest in Shanghai Japanese troops in the ruins of Shanghai skies of China had become a testing zone for advanced biplane and new-generation monoplane combat-aircraft designs.
The introduction of the advanced A5M “Claude” fighters into the Shanghai-Nanjing theater of operations, beginning on 18 September 1937, helped the Japanese achieve a certain level of air superiority. On 23 August, the Chinese Air Force attacked Japanese troop landings at Wusongkou in northern Shanghai with Hawk III fighter-attack planes and P-26/281 fighter escorts, and the Japanese intercepted most of the attack with A2N and A4N fighters from the aircraft carriers Hos ho and Yugo, shooting down several of the Chinese planes while losing a single A4N in the dogfight with Lt. Huang Xingu in his P-26/281; the Japanese Army reinforcements succeeded in landing in northern Shanghai.
The Imperial Japanese Army (IRA) ultimately committed over 200,000 troops, along with numerous naval vessels and aircraft, to capture the city. After more than three months of intense fighting, their casualties far exceeded initial expectations.
On 26 October, the Japanese Army captured Chang, an important strong-point within Shanghai, and on 5 November, additional reinforcements of Japan landed from Hangzhou Bay. Finally, on 9 November, the NRA began a general retreat.
Soviet embassy in Nanjing is being burned down by arson on 1 January 1938. A Chinese POW about to be beheaded by a Japanese officer with a shin unto Historians estimate that between 13 December 1937, and late January 1938, Japanese forces killed or wounded an estimated 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese (mostly civilians) in the Nanjing Massacre (also known as the “Rape of Nanjing”), after its fall. However, historian David Askew of Japan's Ritsumeikan University argued that less than 32,000 civilians and soldiers died and no more than 250,000 civilians could have remained in Nanjing, the vast majority of whom had took refuge in the Nanjing Safety Zone, a foreign-established safety zone led by John Race who was a Nazi party official.
More than 75% of Nanjing's civilian population had already fled Nanjing before the battle commenced while most of the remainder took refuge in Banking Safety Zone, leaving only destitute pariah classes like Tank people and Duo people behind. In 2005, a history textbook prepared by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform which had been approved by the government in 2001, sparked huge outcry and protests in China and Korea.
It referred to the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities such as the Manila massacre as an “incident”, glossed over the issue of comfort women, and made only brief references to the death of Chinese soldiers and civilians in Nanjing. A copy of the 2005 version of a junior high school textbook titled New History Textbook found that there is no mention of the “Nanjing Massacre” or the “Nanjing Incident”.
Indeed, the only one sentence that referred to this event was: “they occupied that city in December”. At the start of 1938, the leadership in Tokyo still hoped to limit the scope of the conflict to occupy areas around Shanghai, Nanjing and most of northern China.
They thought this would preserve strength for an anticipated showdown with the Soviet Union, but by now the Japanese government and GHQ had effectively lost control of the Japanese army in China. With many victories achieved, Japanese field generals escalated the war in Jiangsu in an attempt to wipe out Chinese resistance, but were defeated at the Battle of Taierzhuang (March–April 1938).
Afterwards the IRA changed its strategy and deployed almost all of its existing armies in China to attack the city of Wuhan, which had become the political, economic and military center of rump China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the NRA and of forcing the Km government to negotiate for peace. On 6 June, they captured Kaifeng, the capital of Henan, and threatened to take Zhengzhou, the junction of the Gingham and Songhai railways.
To prevent Japanese advances in western and southern China, Chiang Kaiser, at the suggestion of Chen Guru, ordered the opening of the dikes on the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. The original plan was to destroy the dike in Haiku, but due to difficulties in that place, the Huayuankou dike on the south bank was destroyed on 5 June and 7 June by excavation, with flood waters over eastern Henan, central Anhui, and north central Jiangsu.
The floods covered and destroyed thousands of square kilometers of agricultural land and displaced the mouth of the Yellow River hundreds of miles to the south. 400,000 people including Japanese soldiers drowned and an additional 10 million became refugees.
Damage to plantations also affected the population which generated later hunger. Despite this, the Japanese captured Wuhan on 27 October 1938, forcing the Km to retreat to Chongqing (Chunking), but Chiang Kaiser still refused to negotiate, saying he would only consider talks if Japan agreed to withdraw to the pre-1937 borders.
In 1937, the Japanese Imperial Army quickly marched into the heart of Chinese territory. With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the Imperial General Headquarters attempted to break Chinese resistance by ordering the air branches of their navy and army to launch the war's first massive air raids on civilian targets.
Japanese raiders hit the Kuomintang's newly established provisional capital of Chongqing and most other major cities in unoccupied China, leaving many people either dead, injured, or homeless. Map showing the extent of Japanese occupation in 1941 (in red)Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist guerrilla bases (striped)From the beginning of 1939, the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the Japanese at Battle of Simian–Loyang, 1st Battle of Changsha, Battle of South Jiangxi and Battle of Maori.
These outcomes encouraged the Chinese to launch their first large-scale counter-offensive against the IRA in early 1940; however, due to its low military-industrial capacity and limited experience in modern warfare, this offensive was defeated. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the poorly trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general.
He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped troops in the Battle of Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central Km government. After 1940, the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories, and tried to solve their occupation problems by implementing a strategy of creating friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered, most prominently the Nanjing Nationalist Government headed by former Km premier Wang Jingle.
However, atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army, as well as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left the puppets very unpopular and largely ineffective. The only success the Japanese had been to recruit a large Collaborationist Chinese Army to maintain public security in the occupied areas.
Japan had suffered high casualties from unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in the manner of Nazi Germany in Western Europe. As the situation worsened, New York Chinese compatriots received a letter stating that 600,000 people were killed in SII by starvation.
The basis of Chinese strategy before the entrance of the Western Allies can be divided into two periods as follows: First period (July 1937 – October 1938) Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that to win support from the United States and other foreign nations, China had to prove it was capable of fighting.
Knowing a hasty retreat would discourage foreign aid, Chiang resolved to make a stand at Shanghai, using the best of his German-trained divisions to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three months, saw heavy casualties on both sides, and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing, but proved that China would not be easily defeated and showed its determination to the world.
The battle became an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people, as it decisively refuted the Japanese boast that Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months. The Chinese army would put up fights to delay the Japanese advance to northern and eastern cities, allowing the home front, with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqing.
As a result of Chinese troops' scorched earth strategies, dams and levees were intentionally sabotaged to create massive flooding, which caused thousands of deaths and many more to seek refuge. Second period (October 1938 – December 1941) National Revolutionary Army soldiers march to the front in 1939. During this period, the main Chinese objective was to drag out the war for as long as possible in a war of attrition, thereby exhausting Japanese resources while building up Chinese military capacity.
American general Joseph Stairwell called this strategy “winning by outlasting”. The NRA adopted the concept of “magnetic warfare” to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclement in major engagements.
The most prominent example of this tactic was the successful defense of Changsha in 1939 (and again in 1941), in which heavy casualties were inflicted on the IRA. Local Chinese resistance forces, organized separately by both the communists and Km, continued their resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast land area of China difficult.
It was during this period that the bulk of Japanese war crimes were committed. By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the Km central government and military had retreated to the western interior to continue their resistance, while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi.
In the occupied areas, Japanese control was mainly limited to railroads and major cities (“points and lines”). The United States strongly supported China starting in 1937 and warned Japan to get out.
American financial and military aid began to flow. He headed both the volunteer group and the uniformed U.S. Army Air Forces units that replaced it in 1942.
However, it was the Soviets that provided the greatest material help for China's war of resistance against the imperial Japanese invasion with fighter aircraft for the Nationalist Chinese Air Force and artillery and armor for the Chinese Army through the Sino-Soviet Treaty ; Operation Get also provided for a group of Soviet volunteer combat aviators to join the Chinese Air Force in the fight against the Japanese occupation from late 1937 through 1939. After the Murder Incident in 1931, Chinese public opinion was strongly critical of Manchuria's leader, the “young marshal” Zhang Fueling, for his nonresistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was also responsible for this policy, giving Zhang an order to “improvise” while not offering support.
After losing Manchuria to the Japanese, Zhang and his Northeast Army were given the duty of suppressing the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) in Shaanxi after their Long March. This resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, which received no support in manpower or weaponry from Chiang Kaiser.
Despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938, partially due to the Communists' aggressive efforts to expand their military strength by absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind Japanese lines.
Chinese militia who refused to switch their allegiance were often labelled “collaborators” and attacked by CPC forces. Starting in 1940, open conflict between Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941.
Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and Chinese Communists' leader Mao Zedong outlined the preliminary plan for the CPC's eventual seizure of power from Chiang Kaiser. Mao began his final push for consolidation of CPC power under his authority, and his teachings became the central tenets of the CPC doctrine that came to be formalized as Mao Zedong Thought “.
The communists also began to focus most of their energy on building up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favoring poor peasants ; while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of areas controlled by CPC and fighting the Japanese at the same time. War declaration against Japan by the Chongqing Nationalist Government on 9 December 1941A US poster advocating helping China fight unfollowing the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war against Japan, and within days China joined the Allies in formal declaration of war against Japan, Germany and Italy.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as the world's Four Policemen “, elevating the international status of China to an unprecedented height after the century of humiliation at the hands of various imperialist powers. Knowledge of Japanese naval movements in the Pacific was provided to the American Navy by the Afro-American Cooperative Organization (Sack) which was run by the Chinese intelligence head Die Li.
Chiang Kaiser continued to receive supplies from the United States. After the Doolittle Raid, the Imperial Japanese Army conducted a massive sweep through Zhejiang and Jiangxi of China, now known as the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, with the goal of finding the surviving American airmen, applying retribution on the Chinese who aided them and destroying air bases.
During this campaign, the Imperial Japanese Army left behind a trail of devastation and also spread cholera, typhoid, plague and dysentery pathogens. Chinese estimates allege that as many as 250,000 civilians, the vast majority of whom were destitute Tank boat people and other pariah ethnicities unable to flee, may have died of disease.
It caused more than 16 million civilians to evacuate far away deep inward China. Most of China's industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union refused to allow the United States to supply China through Kazakhstan into Xinjiang as the Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shiva had turned anti-Soviet in 1942 with Chiang's approval.
For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount major counter-offensives. Despite the severe shortage of matériel, in 1943, the Chinese were successful in repelling major Japanese offensives in Hubei and Change.
For many reasons, relations between Stairwell and Chiang soon broke down. Many historians (such as Barbara W. Tucuman) have suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang (Km) government, while others (such as Ray Huang and Hans van de Even) have depicted it as a more complicated situation.
Stairwell had a strong desire to assume total control of Chinese troops and pursue an aggressive strategy, while Chiang preferred a patient and less expensive strategy of out-waiting the Japanese. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture despite Allied pleas to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate in the face of America's overwhelming industrial output.
For these reasons the other Allies gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, many of whom had been routed by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to the reopening of the Burma Road ; Stairwell, on the other hand, believed that reopening the road was vital, as all China's mainland ports were under Japanese control.
The Allies' Europe First policy did not sit well with Chiang, while the later British insistence that China send more and more troops to Indochina for use in the Burma Campaign was seen by Chiang as an attempt to use Chinese manpower to defend British colonial possessions. Chiang also believed that China should divert its crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers that he hoped would defeat Japan through bombing, a strategy that American general Claire Lee Renault supported but which Stairwell strongly opposed.
In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian independence in a 1942 meeting with Mahatma Gandhi, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom. American and Canadian-born Chinese were recruited to act as covert operatives in Japanese-occupied China.
Employing their racial background as a disguise, their mandate was to blend in with local citizens and wage a campaign of sabotage. Chinese forces invaded northern Burma in late 1943 besieged Japanese troops in Myitkyina and captured Mount Song.
The British and Commonwealth forces had their operation in Mission 204 which attempted to provide assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Army. The first phase in 1942 under command of SOE achieved very little, but lessons were learned and a second more successful phase, commenced in February 1943 under British Military command, was conducted before the Japanese Operation Chicago offensive in 1944 compelled evacuation.
The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up many Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In 1944, with the Japanese position in the Pacific deteriorating rapidly, the IRA mobilized over 500,000 men and launched Operation Chicago, their largest offensive of World War II, to attack the American airbases in China and link up the railway between Manchuria and Vietnam.
This brought major cities in Hunan, Henan and Jiangxi under Japanese occupation. The failure of Chinese forces to defend these areas encouraged Stairwell to attempt to gain overall command of the Chinese army, and his subsequent showdown with Chiang led to his replacement by Major General Albert Cody Demeter.
In 1944, China came off of several victories against Japan in Burma leading to overconfidence. The aim of the Japanese Operation Chico was to destroy American airfields in southern China that threatened the Japanese home islands with bombing and to link railways in Beijing, Hank and Canton cities from northern China in Beijing to southern China's coast on Canton.
Japan was alarmed by American air raids against Japanese forces in Taiwan's Since airfield by American bombers based in southern China, correctly deducing that southern China could become the base of a major American bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands so Japan resolved to destroy and capture all airbases where American bombers operated from in Operation Chico. The Chinese military believed it to be a fake tip planted by Japan to mislead them since only 30,000 Japanese soldiers started the first maneuver of Operation Chico in northern China crossing the Yellow River so the Chinese assumed it would be a local operation in northern China only.
Another major factor was that the battlefront between China and Japan was static and stabilized since 1940 and continued for four years that way until Operation Chico in 1944 so Chiang assumed that Japan would continue the same posture and remain behind the lines in pre-1940 occupied territories of North China only bolstering the puppet Chinese government of Wang Jingle and exploiting resources there. The Japanese had indeed acted this way from 1940 to 1944, with the Japanese only making a few failed weak attempts to capture China's provisional capital in Chongqing on the Yangtze river which they quickly abandoned and gave up on before 1944.
Japan also exhibited no intention before of linking the transcontinental Beijing Hank ow Canton railways. China had also defeated Japan in the India- Burma theater in Southeast Asia with X Force and Y Force and the Chinese could not believe Japan had carelessly let information slip into French hands, believing Japan deliberately fed misinformation to the French to divert Chinese troops from India and Burma towards China.
China believed the initial Japanese attack in Chico to be a localized feint and distraction in northern China so Chinese troops numbering 400,000 in North China deliberately withdrew without a fight when Japan attacked, assuming it was just another localized operation after which the Japanese would withdraw. This mistake led to the collapse of Chinese defensive lines as the Japanese soldiers which eventually numbered in the hundreds of thousands kept pressing the attack from northern China to central China to southern China's provinces as Chinese soldiers deliberately withdrew leading to confusion and collapse, except at the Defense of Shenyang where 17,000 outnumbered Chinese soldiers held out against over 110,000 Japanese soldiers for months in the longest siege of the war inflicting 19,000–60,000 deaths on the Japanese.
At Tuscan in Guizhou province, the Nationalist government of China was forced to deploy five armies of the 8th war zone that they were using for the entire war up to Chico to contain the Communist Chinese to instead fight Japan. But at that point, dietary deficiencies of Japanese soldiers and increasing casualties suffered by Japan forced Japan to end Operation Chico in Guizhou causing the operation to cease.
After Operation Chico, Chiang Kaiser started a plan to withdraw Chinese troops from the Burma theater against Japan in Southeast Asia for a counter offensive called “White Tower” and “Iceman” against Japanese soldiers in China in 1945. By the end of 1944 Chinese troops under the command of Sun Listen attacking from India, and those under Wei Huang attacking from Yunnan, joined forces in Mong-Yu, successfully driving the Japanese out of North Burma and securing the Led Road, China's vital supply artery.
In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives that retook Hunan and Jiangxi. With the Chinese army progressing well in training and equipment, Demeter planned to launch Operation Carbon ado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdong, thus obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai.
However, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet invasion of Manchuria hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action. Germany and the Soviet Union provided aid to China at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
By 1940 the United States had become China's main diplomatic, financial and military supporter. Over 3,200 overseas Chinese drivers and motor vehicle mechanics embarked to wartime China to support military and logistics supply lines, especially through Indochina, which became of absolute tantamount importance when the Japanese cut-off all ocean-access to China's interior with the capture of Banning after the Battle of South Jiangxi.
Overseas Chinese communities in the U.S. raised money and nurtured talent in response to Imperial Japan's aggression in China, which helped to fund an entire squadron of Boeing P-26 Model 281 fighter planes purchased for the looming war situation between China and the Empire of Japan; over a dozen Chinese-American aviators, including John “Buffalo” Huang, Arthur Chin, Hazel King Lee, Chan Keeping et al., formed the original contingent of foreign volunteer aviators to join the Chinese Air Force (some provincial or warlord air forces, but ultimately all integrating into the centralized Chinese Air Force) in the “patriotic call to duty for the motherland” to fight against the Imperial Japanese invasion. Prior to the war, Germany and China were in close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials.
Germany sent military advisers such as Alexander on Falkenhausen to China to help the Km government reform its armed forces. After the Km lost Nanjing and retreated to Wuhan, Hitler's government decided to withdraw its support of China in 1938 in favor of an alliance with Japan as its main anti-Communist partner in East Asia.
After Germany and Japan signed the anti-communist Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet Union hoped to keep China fighting, in order to deter a Japanese invasion of Siberia and save itself from a two-front war. In September 1937, they signed the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Get, the formation of a secret Soviet volunteer air force, in which Soviet technicians upgraded and ran some of China's transportation systems.
Bombers, fighters, supplies and advisors arrived, including Soviet general Vasily Zhukov, future victor in the Battle of Stalingrad. Prior to the Western Allies, the Soviets provided the most foreign aid to China: some $250 million in credits for munitions and other supplies.
In April 1941, Soviet aid to China ended with the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time.
In August 1945, the Soviet Union annulled the neutrality pact with Japan and invaded Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the Kuril Islands, and northern Korea. The Soviets also continued to support the Chinese Communist Party.
In total, 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots served in China, and 227 of them died fighting there. For instance, the 1934 Silver Purchase Act signed by President Roosevelt caused chaos in China's economy which helped the Japanese war effort.
The 1933 Wheat and Cotton Loan mainly benefited American producers, while aiding to a smaller extent both Chinese and Japanese alike. This policy was due to US fear of breaking off profitable trade ties with Japan, in addition to US officials and businesses perception of China as a potential source of massive profit for the US by absorbing surplus American products, as William Apple man Williams states.
From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Pansy and the Nanjing Massacre swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to China. However, in July 1939, negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Anita Katina and the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Robert Craig, led to an agreement by which Great Britain recognized Japanese conquests in China.
At the same time, the US government extended a trade agreement with Japan for six months, then fully restored it. Under the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Wanting Army, machine tools for aircraft factories, strategic materials (steel and scrap iron up to 16 October 1940, petrol and petroleum products up to 26 June 1941), and various other much-needed supplies.
In a hearing before the United States Congress House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on Wednesday, 19 April 1939, the acting chairman Sol Bloom and other Congressmen interviewed Maxwell S. Stewart, a former Foreign Policy Association research staff and economist who charged that America's Neutrality Act and its “neutrality policy” was a massive farce which only benefited Japan and that Japan did not have the capability nor could ever have invaded China without the massive amount of raw material America exported to Japan. America exported far more raw material to Japan than to China in the years 1937–1940.
Japan's military machine acquired all the war materials, automotive equipment, steel, scrap iron, copper, oil, that it wanted from the United States in 1937–1940 and was allowed to purchase aerial bombs, aircraft equipment, and aircraft from America up to the summer of 1938. War essentials exports from the United States to Japan increased by 124% along with a general increase of 41% of all exports from 1936 to 1937 when Japan invaded China.
According to the 1939 Reports to the Annual National Convention of the American Legion, in 1936 1,467,639 tons of scrap metal from all foreign nations were exported to Japan while since 1937 Japan's dependence on the United States of America grew massively for war materials and supplies against China. The US contributed massively to the Japanese war economy in 1937 with 20.4% of zinc, 48.5% of engines and machinery, 59.7% of iron, 41.6% of pig iron, 60.5% of oil, 91.2% of automobiles and parts, 92.9% of copper of Japan were imported from the U.S. in 1937 according to a hearing by the United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
During the Japanese war against China, 54.4% of Japan's weapons and supplies were provided by Americans. 76% of Japanese planes came from the US in 1938, and all lubricating oil, machine tools, special steel, high-test aircraft petrol came from the US, as did 59.7% of Japan's scrap iron and 60.5% of Japan's petrol in 1937.
Japan by itself had scant and meager resources and could not have prosecuted war against China or dreamed of empire without massive imports. The Dutch East Indies, the British Empire and United States of America were the top exporters of war supplies for Japan's military against China in 1937, with 7.4% from the Dutch, 17.5% from the British and 54.4% from the United States of America.
Oil, scrap iron and rubber were all sold by France, the Netherlands, Britain and the U.S. to Japan after the invasion of China in 1937. In 15 Sep 1939 American oil companies unveiled contracts to deliver three million barrels of petroleum to the Japanese Navy.
A blood chit issued to American Volunteer Group pilots requesting all Chinese to offer rescue and protection 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In spite of non-aggression pacts or trade connections, Hitler's assault threw the world into a frenzy of re-aligning political outlooks and strategic prospects.
From bases in Cambodia and southern Vietnam, Japanese planes could attack Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. As the Japanese occupation of northern French Indochina in 1940 had already cut off supplies from the West to China, the move into southern French Indochina was viewed as a direct threat to British and Dutch colonies.
Many principal figures in the Japanese government and military (particularly the navy) were against the move, as they foresaw that it would invite retaliation from the West. Free Thai, American and Chinese military officers in China during the war On 24 July 1941, Roosevelt requested Japan withdraw all its forces from Indochina.
The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China on a long-term basis. US Air Forces video: Flying Tigers Bite Backing mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or Flying Tigers, to replace the withdrawn Soviet volunteers and aircraft.
Contrary to popular perception, the Flying Tigers did not enter actual combat until after the United States had declared war on Japan. Led by Claire Lee Renault, their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their newly introduced shark painted P-40 fighters heavily armed with 6×50 caliber machine guns and very fast diving speeds earned them wide recognition at a time when the Chinese Air Force and Allies in the Pacific and SE Asia were suffering heavy losses, and soon afterwards their “boom and zoom” high-speed hit-and-run dissimilar air combat tactics would be adopted by the United States Army Air Forces.
The India–China airlift delivered approximately 650,000 tons of material to China at a cost of 1,659 men and 594 aircraft. The Afro-American Cooperative Organization was an organization created by the Sack Treaty signed by the Republic of China and the United States of America in 1942 that established a mutual intelligence gathering entity in China between the respective nations against Japan. It operated in China jointly along with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first intelligence agency and forerunner of the CIA while also serving as joint training program between the two nations.
Among all the wartime missions that Americans set up in China, Sack was the only one that adopted a policy of “total immersion” with the Chinese. The “Rice Paddy Navy” or “What-the-Hell Gang” operated in the China-Burma-India theater, advising and training, forecasting weather and scouting landing areas for USN fleet and Gen Claire Renault's 14th AF, rescuing downed American flyers, and intercepting Japanese radio traffic.
An underlying mission objective during the last year of war was the development and preparation of the China coast for Allied penetration and occupation. The Foo chow (Fujian Province) was scouted as a potential staging area and springboard for the future military landing of the Allies of World War II in Japan.
In February 1941 a Sino-British agreement was forged whereby British troops would assist the Chinese “Surprise Troops” units of guerrillas already operating in China, and China would assist Britain in Burma. A British-Australian commando operation, Mission 204, was initialized in February 1942 to provide training to Chinese guerilla troops.
The mission conducted two operations, mostly in the provinces of Yunnan and Jiangxi. After the Japanese blocked the Burma Road in April 1942, and before the Led Road was finished in early 1945, the majority of US and British supplies to the Chinese had to be delivered via airlift over the eastern end of the Himalayan Mountains known as the Hump.
Flying over the Himalayas was extremely dangerous, but the airlift continued daily to August 1945, at great cost in men and aircraft. In Jiangxi, Chinese military leaders were organizing Vietnamese nationalists against the Japanese.
The VN QDD had been active in Jiangxi and some of their members had joined the Km army. Under the umbrella of Km activities, a broad alliance of nationalists emerged.
With Ho at the forefront, the View Nam Doc Lap Dong Mind HOI (Vietnamese Independence League, usually known as the View Mind) was formed and based in the town of Jiangxi. The pro-VNQDD nationalist Ho NGC Lam, a Km army officer and former disciple of Than BOI Chat, was named as the deputy of Ham Van Long, later to be Ho's Prime Minister.
The front was later broadened and renamed the View Nam IAI Phone Dong Mind (Vietnam Liberation League). The View Nam Revolutionary League was a union of various Vietnamese nationalist groups, run by the pro Chinese VN QDD.
Its stated goal was for unity with China under the Three Principles of the People, created by Km founder Dr. Sun and opposition to Japanese and French Imperialists. The Revolutionary League was controlled by Nguyen HAI Than, who was born in China and could not speak Vietnamese .
General Zhang shrewdly blocked the Communists of Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh from entering the league, as Zhang's main goal was Chinese influence in Indochina. The Km utilized these Vietnamese nationalists during World War II against Japanese forces.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, through General Stairwell, privately made it clear that they preferred that the French not reacquire French Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) after the war was over. Roosevelt offered Chiang Kaiser control of all of Indochina.
After the war, 200,000 Chinese troops under General Lu Han were sent by Chiang Kaiser to northern Indochina (north of the 16th parallel) to accept the surrender of Japanese occupying forces there, and remained in Indochina until 1946, when the French returned. Chiang Kaiser threatened the French with war in response to maneuvering by the French and Ho Chi Minh's forces against each other, forcing them to come to a peace agreement.
In February 1946, he also forced the French to surrender all of their concessions in China and to renounce their extraterritorial privileges in exchange for the Chinese withdrawing from northern Indochina and allowing French troops to reoccupy the region. Following France's agreement to these demands, the withdrawal of Chinese troops began in March 1946.
General Ma Hush an was expecting help from Nanjing, as he exchanged messages with Chiang regarding the Soviet attack. The Republic of China government was fully aware of the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang province, and Soviet troops moving around Xinjiang and Gansu, but it was forced to mask these maneuvers to the public as “Japanese propaganda” to avoid an international incident and for continued military supplies from the Soviets.
General Ma Buying was in virtual control of the Gansu corridor at that time. Chiang named Ma as Reclamation Commissioner, to threaten Sheng Shicai's southern flank in Xinjiang, which bordered Saddam.
After Ma evacuated his positions in Gansu, Kuomintang troops from central China flooded the area, and infiltrated Soviet occupied Xinjiang, gradually reclaiming it and forcing Sheng Shiva to break with the Soviets. The Kuomintang ordered Ma Bu fang several times to march his troops into Xinjiang to intimidate the pro-Soviet Governor Sheng Shiva.
This helped provide protection for Chinese settling in Xinjiang. The Ill Rebellion broke out in Xinjiang when the Kuomintang Hui Officer Liu Bin-Di was killed while fighting Turkic Uighur rebels in November 1944.
Japan attempted to reach out to Chinese ethnic minorities in order to rally them to their side against the Han Chinese, but only succeeded with certain Manchu, Mongol, Uighur and Tibetan elements. The Japanese attempted to approach Ma Bu fang but were unsuccessful in making any agreement with him.
Ma Bu fang ended up supporting the anti-Japanese Imam HU Song shan, who prayed for the destruction of the Japanese. Ma became chairman (governor) of Qinghai in 1938 and commanded a group army.
General Han You wen directed the defense of the city of Mining during air raids by Japanese planes. Han survived an aerial bombardment by Japanese planes in Mining while he was being directed via telephone by Ma Bu fang, who hid in an air raid shelter in a military barrack.
The bombing resulted in Han being buried in rubble, though he was later rescued. WWII victory parade at Chunking on 3 September 1945In less than two weeks the Wanting Army, which was the primary Japanese fighting force, consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support, had been destroyed by the Soviets.
Japanese Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on 15 August 1945. The official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missouri on 2 September 1945, in a ceremony where several Allied commanders including Chinese general CSU Yung-chang were present.
Japanese troops surrendering to the Chinese return to Suzhou in July 1945. Chiang Kaiser and Mao Zedong in 1945In 1945, China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but economically weak and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by corruption in the Nationalist government that included profiteering, speculation and hoarding.
Furthermore, as part of the Yalta Conference, which allowed a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, the Soviets dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to China. Large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was starvation in the wake of the war.
Many towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods. The problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened, and their policies left them unpopular.
Meanwhile, the war strengthened the Communists both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At An'an and elsewhere in the communist controlled areas, Mao Zedong was able to adapt Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions.
He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. The Chinese Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people.
Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. With skillful organization and propaganda, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945.
Mao also began to execute his plan to establish a new China by rapidly moving his forces from An'an and elsewhere to Manchuria. This opportunity was available to the Communists because although Nationalist representatives were not invited to Yalta, they had been consulted and had agreed to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in the belief that the Soviet Union would cooperate only with the Nationalist government after the war.
However, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communist forces moving in en masse and arm themselves with the military hardware surrendered by the Imperial Japanese Army, quickly establish control in the countryside and move into position to encircle the Nationalist government army in major cities of northeast China. In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese to preserve their strength for a final showdown with the Communist Party of China (CPC or CCP), while the Communists were the main military force in the Chinese resistance efforts.
Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CPC has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China now states that the Km fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while the CPC engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines.
The Nationalists suffered higher casualties because they were the main combatants opposing the Japanese in each of the 22 major battles (involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides) between China and Japan. The Communist forces, by contrast, usually avoided pitched battles with the Japanese and generally limited their combat to guerilla actions (the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions).
The Nationalists committed their strongest divisions in early battle against the Japanese (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai and continued to deploy most of their forces to fight the Japanese even as the Communists changed their strategy to engage mainly in a political offensive against the Japanese while declaring that the CPC should “save and preserve our strength and wait for favorable timing” by the end of 1941. Today, the war is a major point of contention and resentment between China and Japan.
Issues regarding the current historical outlook on the war exist. For example, the Japanese government has been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of a few school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past, although the most recent controversial book, the New History Textbook was used by only 0.039% of junior high schools in Japan and despite the efforts of the Japanese nationalist textbook reformers, by the late 1990s the most common Japanese schoolbooks contained references to, for instance, the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, and the comfort women of World War II, all historical issues which have faced challenges from ultranationalists in the past.
Taiwan and the Pelf islands were put under the administrative control of the Republic of China (ROC) government in 1945 by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The ROC proclaimed Taiwan Retrocession Day on 25 October 1945.
However, due to the unresolved Chinese Civil War, neither the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China nor the Nationalist ROC that retreated to Taiwan was invited to sign the Treaty of San Francisco, as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity to enter into an international legally binding agreement. Since China was not present, the Japanese only formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Pelf islands without specifying to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952.
Both the PRC and ROC governments base their claims to Taiwan on the Japanese Instrument of Surrender which specifically accepted the Potsdam Declaration which refers to the Cairo Declaration. Disputes over the precise du jour sovereign of Taiwan persist to the present.
On a de facto basis, sovereignty over Taiwan has been and continues to be exercised by the ROC. Japan's position has been to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintaining that Japan renounced all claims to sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.
Meanwhile, many Km supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of Km stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Eaten Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the Km held its own exhibit in the Km headquarters.
Whereas the Km won the presidential election in 2008, the ROC government resumed commemorating the war. Several thousand Japanese who were sent as colonizers to Manchu and Inner Mongolia were left behind in China.
The majority of Japanese left behind in China were women, and these Japanese women mostly married Chinese men and became known as “stranded war wives” (zany Fuji). In China some Korean comfort women stayed behind instead of going back to their native land.
Most Korean comfort women left behind in China married Chinese men. The conflict lasted eight years, two months and two days (from 7 July 1937, to 9 September 1945).
The total number of casualties that resulted from this war (and subsequently theater) equaled more than half the total number of casualties that later resulted from the entire Pacific War. Casualties of a mass panic during a June 1941 Japanese bombing of Chongqing.
Japanese war crime against a Chinese POW Chinese sources list the total number of military and non-military casualties, both dead and wounded, at 35 million. Dr Duncan Anderson, Head of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, UK, writing for BBC states that the total number of casualties was around 20 million.
The figures for total military casualties, killed and wounded are: NRA 3.2 million; Communist 500,000. The official account of the war published in Taiwan reported that the Nationalist Chinese Army lost 3,238,000 men (1,797,000 wounded, 1,320,000 killed, and 120,000 missing) and 5,787,352 civilians casualties putting the total number of casualties at 9,025,352.
The Nationalists fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes. An academic study published in the United States estimates military casualties: 1.5 million killed in battle, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 million deaths due to disease and 3 million wounded; civilian casualties: due to military activity, killed 1,073,496 and 237,319 wounded; 335,934 killed and 426,249 wounded in Japanese air attacks.
The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the gross domestic product of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion). Rudolph Rommel gave a figure of only 3,949,000 people in China murdered directly by the Japanese army while giving a figure of 10,216,000 total dead in the war with the additional millions of deaths due to indirect causes like starvation, disease and disruption but not direct killing by Japan.
China suffered from famines during the war caused by drought affected both China and India, Chinese famine of 1942–43 in Henan that led to starvation deaths of 2 to 3 million people, Guangdong famine caused more than 3 million people to flee or die, and the 1943–1945 Indian famine in Bengal that killed about 7 million Indian civilians in Bihar and Bengal. The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties during all World War II (which include killed, wounded and missing).
The official death toll of Japanese men killed in China, according to the Japan Defense Ministry, is 480,000. Another source from Hilary Conroy claims that a total of 447,000 Japanese soldiers died in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Another 54,000 soldiers also died after the war had ended, mostly from illness and starvation. Japanese statistics, however, lack complete estimates for the wounded.
Disease also incurred critical losses on Japanese forces. In North China alone, 18,000 soldiers were evacuated back to Japan for illnesses in 1938, 23,000 in 1939, and 15,000 in 1940.
Chinese forces also report that by May 1945, 22,293 Japanese soldiers were captured as prisoners. Contemporary studies from the Beijing Central Compilation and Translation Press have revealed that the Japanese suffered a total of 2,227,200 casualties, including 1,055,000 dead and 1,172,341 injured.
Both Nationalist and Communist Chinese sources report that their respective forces were responsible for the deaths of over 1.7 million Japanese soldiers. Nationalist War Minister He Kingpin himself contested the Communists' claims, finding it impossible for a force of “untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped” guerrillas of Communist forces to have killed so many enemy soldiers.
In 1940, the National Herald stated that the Japanese exaggerated Chinese casualties, while deliberately concealing the true number of Japanese casualties, releasing false figures that made them appear lower. Japan made heavy use of chemical weapons against China to make up for lack of numbers in combat and because China did not have any poison gas stockpiles of its own to retaliate.
Japan used poison gas at Hank ow in the Battle of Wuhan to break fierce Chinese resistance after conventional Japanese assaults were repelled by Chinese defenders. Reyna Matter wrote Under General Due Due, some 100,000 Chinese troops pushed back Japanese forces at Hangmen.
At the fortress of Tianjiazhen, thousands of men fought until the end of September, with Japanese victory assured only with the use of poison gas. Yet even now, top Chinese generals seemed unable to work with each other at Xinjiang, Li Mongrel's Jiangxi troops were battered to exhaustion.
Bacteriological weapons provided by Shirt Ishii's units were also profusely used. For example, in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force bombed Ringo with fleas carrying the bubonic plague.
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